Kant and Equality Essay Example for Free

Kant and Equality Essay Some readers of this essay will have become impatient by now; because they believe that the problem that perplexes me has been definitively solved by Immanuel Kant. It is certainly true that Kant held strong opinions on this matter. In an often-quoted passage, he reports a personal conversion from elitism: â€Å"I am myself a researcher by inclination. I feel the whole thirst for knowledge and the eager unrest to move further on into it, also satisfaction with each acquisition. There was a time when I thought this alone could constitute the honor of humanity and despised the know nothing rabble. Rousseau set me straight. This delusory superiority vanishes, I learn to honor men, and I would find myself more useless than a common laborer if I did not believe this observation could give everyone a value which restores the rights of humanity. †What Kant learned from Rousseau was the proposition that the basis of human equality is the dignity that each human person possesses in virtue of the capacity for autonomy (moral freedom). This moral freedom has two aspects, the capacity to set ends for oneself according to one’s conception of what is good, and the capacity to regulate one’s choice of ends and of actions to achieve one’s ends by one’s conception of what morality requires. According to Kant’s psychology, brute animals are determined to act as instinct inclines them, but a rational being has the power to interrogate the inclinations it feels, to raise the question what it is reasonable to do in given circumstances, and to choose to do what reason suggests even against all inclinations. The question arises whether Kant’s psychology is correct, or remotely close to correct. Perhaps something like the conflict between conscience and inclination is experienced by social animals other than humans. Perhaps the freedom that Kant imputes to human on metaphysical grounds can be shown to be either empirically nonexistent or illusory. For our purposes we can set these questions aside and simply presume that the human psychological complexity envisaged by Kant does describe capacity we possess, whether or not it is shared with other animals. My question is whether Kant’s characterization, if it was correct, would have the normative implication she draws from it. It might seem that the Kantian picture helps to show how moral freedom is arrange concept, which does not significantly admit of degrees. If one has the capacity to set an end for oneself, one does not possess this freedom to a lesser extent just because one cannot set fancy ends, or because other persons can set fancier ends. If one has the power to regulate choice of ends by one’s sense of what is morally right, one does not possess this freedom to a lesser extent because one cannot understand sophisticated moral considerations, or because other persons can understand more sophisticated moral considerations. Moreover, one might hold that it is having or lacking the freedom which is important, not having or lacking the capacity to exercise the freedom in fancy ways. But the old worries lurk just around the corner. The Kantian view is that there are indeed capacities that are crucial for the ascription of fundamental moral status that do not vary in degree. One either has the capacity or one does not, and that’s that. If the crucial capacities have this character, then the problem of how to draw a no arbitrary line on a continuum and hold all beings on one side of the line full persons and all beings on the other side of the line lesser beings does not arise. The line separating persons and nonpersons will be non arbitrary, and there will be no basis for further differentiation of moral status. One is either a person or not, and all persons are equal. Consider the capacity to set an end, to choose a goal and decide on an action to achieve it. One might suppose that all humans have this capacity except for the permanently comatose and the anencephalic. So all humans are entitled to a fundamental equal moral status. This view is strengthened by noting that there are other capacities that do admit of degrees that interact with the no degree capacities. Individuals who equally have the capacity to set an end may well differ in the quality of their end-setting performances. Some are able to set ends more reasonably than others. But these differences in performance do not gainsay the fundamental equal capacity. It is just that having a high or low level of associated capacities enables or impedes successful performance. So the fact that individuals differ in their abilities to do arithmetic and more complex mathematical operations that affect their ability to make rational choices should have no tendency to obscure the more basic and morally status-conferring equality in the capacity of each person to make choices. In response: First of all, if several of these no degree capacities were relevant to moral status, one must possess all to be at the top status, and some individuals possess more and others fewer of the relevant capacities, a problem of hierarchy, though perhaps a manageable one, would emerge anew. More important, I doubt there is a plausible no degree capacity that can do the work this argument assigns to it. Take the capacity to set ends and make choices. Consider a being that has little brain power, but over the course of its life can set just a few ends and make just a few choices based on considering two or three simple alternatives. It sets one end (lunch, now) per decade three times over the course of its life. If there is a capacity to set ends, period, not admitting of degrees, this being possesses it. The point is that it is clearly not merely the capacity to set ends, but something more complex that renders a being a person in our eyes. What matters is whether or not one has the capacity to set sensible ends and to pick among alternative end at a reasonable pace, sorting through complex considerations that bear on the choice of ends and responding in a rational way to these considerations. But this capacity, along with any similar or related capacity that might be urged as a substitute for it, definitely admits of degrees. The same point would hold if we pointed to free will or moral autonomy as the relevant person-determining capacity. It is not the ability to choose an end on ground of consideration for moral considerations merely, but the ability to do this in a nuanced and fine-grained responsive way, that is plausibly deemed to entitle a being to personhood status. In general, we single out rationality, the ability to respond appropriately to reasons, as the capacity that is pertinent to personhood, by itself or in conjunction with related abilities, and rationality so understood admits of degrees. Kant may well have held that the uses of reason that are required in order to have a well-functioning conscience that can tell right from wrong are not very sophisticated and are well within the reach of all non crazy non feebleminded humans. Ordinary intelligence suffices. His discussions of applying the categorical imperative test certainly convey this impression. But commentators tend to agree that there is no simple all-purpose moral test that easily answers all significant moral questions. Thus Christine Korsgaard cautions that the categorical imperative test is not a â€Å"Geiger counter† for detecting the presence of moral duties, and Barbara Herman observes that the application of the categorical imperative test to cases cannot be a mechanical procedure but relies on prior moral understanding by the agent and on the agent’s capacity to make relevant moral discriminations and judgments and to characterize her own proposed maxims perspicuously. These comments confirm what should be clear in any event: Moral problems can be complex and difficult, and there is no discernible upper bound to the complexity of the reasoning required to master and perhaps solve them. But suppose I do the best I can with my limited cognitive resources, I make a judgment as to what is morally right, however misguided, and I am conscientiously resolved to do what I take to be morally right. The capacity to do what is right can be factored into two components, the ability to decide what is right and the ability to dispose oneself to do what one thinks is right. One might hold the latter capacity to be the true locus of human dignity and worth. Resisting temptation and doing what one thinks is right is noble and admirable even if one’s conscience is a broken thermometer. However, one might doubt that being disposed to follow one’s conscience is unambiguously good when one’s conscience is seriously in error. For one thing, moral flaws such as a lazy indisposition to hard thinking and an obsequious deference toward established power and authority might play a large role in fixing the content of one’s judgments of conscience. A conceited lack of healthy skepticism about one’s cognitive powers might be a determinant of one’s strong disposition to do whatever one thinks to be right. Even if Kant is correct that the good will, the will directed unfailingly at what is truly right, has an absolute and unconditional worth, it is doubtful that the would-be good will, a will directed toward what it takes to be right on whatever flimsy or solid grounds appeal to it, has such worth. Take an extreme case: Suppose a particular person has a would-be good will that is always in error. This could be strong or righteous, so that the agent always does what he thinks is right, or weak and corrupt, so that the agent never does what she thinks is right. If the will is always in error, the odds of doing the right thing are increased if the would-be good will is weak and corrupt. Some might value more highly on consequential grounds the weak and corrupt erroneous will, even though the strong and righteous invariably erroneous will always shines like a jewel in its own right. And some might hold that quite aside from the expected consequences, acting on a seriously erroneous judgment of right is inherently of lesser worth than acting on correct judgment of right. Even if the disposition to do what one thinks morally right is unassailable, its purported value does not provide a sound basis for asserting the equal worth and dignity of human persons. The capacity to act conscientiously itself varies empirically across persons like any other valued capacity. A favorable genetic endowment and favorable early socialization experiences bestow more of this capacity on some persons and less on others. If we think of an agent’s will as disposed more or less strongly to do what she conscientiously believes to be right, different individuals with the same disposition will experience good and bad luck in facing temptations that exceed their resolve. Even if we assume that agents always have freedom of the will, it will be difficult to different degrees for different persons to exercise their free will as conscience dictates. Moreover, individuals will vary in their psychological capacities to dispose their will to do what conscience dictates. One might retreat further to the claim that all persons equally can try to dispose their will to do what is right, even if they will succeed in this enterprise to different degrees. But the ability to try is also a psychological capacity that we should expect would vary empirically across persons. At times Kant seems to appeal to epistemic grounds in reasoning from the goodness of the good will to the equal worth and dignity of all human persons. We don’t know what anyone’s inner motivations are, even our own, so the judgment that anyone is firmly disposed to do what is right can never be confirmed. But surely the main issue is whether humans are so ordered that we ought to accord them fundamental equal moral status, not whether, given our beliefs, it is reasonable for us to act as if they are so ordered. The idea that there is a threshold of rational agency capacity such that any being with a capacity above the threshold is a person equal in fundamental moral status to all other persons prompts a worry about how to identify this threshold non arbitrarily. It might seem that only the difference between nil capacity and some capacity would preclude the skeptical doubt that the line set at any positive level of capacity could just as well have been set higher or lower. Regarding the proposal to identify any above-zero capacity as qualifying one for personhood, we imagine a being with barely a glimmer of capacity to perceive the good and the right and to dispose its will toward their attainment. The difference between none and some might be infinitesimal, after all. However, a threshold need not be razor-thin. Perhaps there is a line below which beings with rational capacities in this range are definitely not persons and a higher level such that all beings with capacities above this level are definitely persons. Beings with rational capacities that fall in the middle range or gray area between these levels are near-persons. The levels can be set sufficiently far apart that the difference between scoring at the lower and the higher levels is undeniably of moral significance. But the difference between the rational capacities of the beings just above the higher line, call them marginal persons, and the beings at the upper end of the scale who have saintly genius capacities, is not thereby shown to be insignificant. At the lower end we might imagine persons like the villains depicted in the Dirty Harry Clint Eastwood movies. These unfortunates are not shown as having moral capacities which they are flouting, but rather as bad by nature, and perhaps not entitled to full human rights. No doubt this is a crass outlook, but the question remains whether the analysis we can offer of the basis for human equality generates a refutation of it. Suppose someone asserts that the difference between the rational agency capacities of the most perceptive saints and the most unreflective and animalistic villains defines a difference in fundamental moral status that is just as important for morality as the difference between the rational agency capacities of near-persons and marginal persons. What mistake does this claim embody? COMMENTS ON KANTS ETHICAL THEORY Because we so commonly take it for granted that moral values are intimately connected with the goal of human well-being or happiness, Kants insistence that these two concepts are absolutely independent makes it difficult to grasp his point of view and easy to misunderstand it. The following comments are intended to help the you to avoid the most common misunderstandings and appreciate the sort of outlook that characterizes what Kant takes to be the heart of the ethical life. Kants ethical theory is often cited as the paradigm of a deontological theory. Although the theory certainly can be seriously criticized, it remains probably the finest analysis of the bases of the concepts of moral principle and moral obligation. Kants endeavor to ground moral duty in the nature of the human being as essentially a rational being marks him as the last great Enlightenment thinker. In spite of the fact that his critical philosophy in epistemology and metaphysics brought an end to The Age of Reason, in ethics his attempt to derive the form of any ethical duty from the very nature of a rational being is the philosophical high water mark of the Enlightenments vision of humanity as essentially and uniquely rational. What Kant aims to provide is a metaphysics of morals in the sense of an analysis of the grounds of moral obligation in the nature of a rational being. In other words, Kant aims to deduce his ethical theory purely by a priori reasoning from the concept of what it is to be a human person as a rational agent. The fact that people have the faculty of being able to use reason to decide how to act expresses the fundamental metaphysical principle -the basis or foundation in the nature of reality- on which Kants ethical theory is erected. Kant begins his treatise, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals with the famous dramatic sentence: Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will. 1. What does Kant mean by good without qualification? Obviously people try to seek and avoid many different sorts of things; those things which they seek they call good, while those they try to avoid, they call bad. These goods which people seek may be divided into those which are sought as means to some further end and those which they seek as good as ends in themselves. Obviously some things may be good as means to one end and bad as means to some other end. Different persons, motivated by different ends, will thus find different things good and bad (relative to their different ends). More food is good to a starving man, but it is bad to one overweight. In order for something to be good without qualification it must not be merely good as means to one end but bad as means to some other end. It must be sought as good totally independently of serving as a means to something else; it must be good in-itself. Furthermore, while one thing may be good as means relative to a particular end, that end becomes a means relative to some other end. So a college diploma may be sought as good as a means for the end of a higher-paying job. And a higher-paying job may be good as a means to increased financial security; and increased financial security may be good as a means to obtaining the necessities of life as well as a few of its luxuries. However, if we seek A only for the sake of B, and B only for the sake of C, etc. , then there is never a justification for seeking A at the beginning of such a series unless there is something at the end of that series which we seek as a good in-itself not merely as means to some further end. Such an ultimate end would then be an absolute rather than a relative good. Kant means that a good will is good without qualification as such an absolute good in-itself, universally good in every instance and never merely as good to some yet further end. 2. Why is a good will the only thing which is universally absolutely good? Kants point is that to be universally and absolutely good, something must be good in every instance of its occurrence. He argues that all those things which people call good (including intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, perseverance, power, riches, honor, health, and even happiness itself) can become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them is not good. In other words, if we imagine a bad person (i. e. one who willed or wanted to do evil), who had all of these so-called goods (intelligence, wit, etc. ), these very traits would make only that much worse his will to do what is wrong. (We would get the criminal master-mind of the comic books. ) Even health often also cited as a good in- itself may serve to make a person insensitive and indifferent to the lack of good health in others. 3. Isnt happiness such a universal, absolute good in-itself? Kant answers clearly, No. However, many philosophers (the ones we call eudaemonists) have assumed the obvious answer to be Yes. All ancient eudaemonistic ethical theories as well as modern utilitarian theories virtually define happiness as the absolute end of all ethical behavior. Such eudaemonistic ethical theories are attractive because of the fact that they make it easy to answer the question Why should I do what is morally right? For any eudaemonistic theory the answer will always be Because the morally right action is always ultimately in the interest of your own happiness. Since these theories generally assume that people really are motivated by a desire for their own happiness, their only problem is to show that the morally right action really does serve as the best means to obtain the end of happiness. Once you are led to see this, so such theories assume, the question Why should I do what is morally right? is automatically answered. Kant totally rejects this eudaemonistic way of ethical theorizing; he calls decisions made according to such a calculation of what produces your own happiness prudential decisions and he distinguishes them sharply from ethical decisions. This is not because Kant thinks we are not motivated by a desire for happiness, in fact like the ancient philosophers, he takes it for granted that we are; however, such motivation cannot be that which makes an action ethically right or wrong. The fact that an action might lead to happiness cannot be the grounds of moral obligation. Kant regards the notion of happiness as both too indefinite and too empirical to serve as the grounds for moral obligation why we ought to do something. In the first place it is too indefinite because all people have very different sorts of talents, tastes and enjoyments which mean in effect that one persons happiness may be another persons misery. This is because the concept is empirical in the sense that the only way you can know whether what you seek will actually serve to bring you happiness is by experience. As Kant points out, it is impossible that the most clear-sighted [man] should frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this. Since we cannot know a priori before an action whether it really will be conducive to our happiness (because the notion is so indefinite that even the most clear-sighted amongst us cannot know everything that must form part of his own happiness) the desire for our own happiness cannot serve as a motive to determine our will to do this or that action. Moreover, Kant observes that even the general well-being and contentment with ones condition that is called happiness, can inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind. In other words happiness cannot be good without qualification for if we imagine it occurring in a person totally devoid of the desire to do what is right, it could very well lead to all sorts of immoral actions. 4. What does Kant mean by a good will? To act out of a good will for Kant means to act out of a sense of moral obligation or duty. In other words, the moral agent does a particular action not because of what it produces (its consequences) in terms of human experience, but because he or she recognizes by reasoning that it is morally the right thing to do and thus regards him or herself as having a moral duty or obligation to do that action. One may of course as an added fact get some pleasure or other gain from doing the right thing, but to act morally, one does not do it for the sake of its desirable consequences, but rather because one understands that it is morally the right thing to do. In this respect Kants view towards morality parallels the Christians view concerning obedience to Gods commandments, according to which the Christian obeys Gods commandments simply because God commands them, not for the sake of rewards in heaven after death or from fear of punishment in hell. In a similar way, for Kant the rational being does what is morally right because he recognizes himself as having a moral duty to do so rather than for anything he or she may get out of it. 5. When does one act from a motive of doing ones duty? Kant answers that we do our moral duty when our motive is determined by a principle recognized by reason rather than the desire for any expected consequence or emotional feeling which may cause us to act the way we do. The will is defined as that which provides the motives for our actions. Obviously many times we are motivated by specific desires or emotions. I may act the way I do from a feeling of friendship for a particular individual, or from desire for a particular consequence. I may also be motivated by particular emotions of fear, or envy, or pity, etc. When I act in these ways, I am motivated by a desire for a particular end; in Kants vocabulary I am said to act out of inclination. Insofar as an action is motivated by inclination, the motive to do it is contingent upon the desire for the particular end which the action is imagined to produce. Thus as different rational agents might have different inclinations, there is no one motive from inclination common to all rational beings. Kant distinguishes acts motivated by inclination from those done on principle. For example someone may ask why I did a certain thing, and point out that it brought me no gain, or perhaps even made life a bit less pleasant; to which I might reply, I know I do not stand to gain by this action, but I do it because of the principle of the thing. For Kant, this sort of state of mind is the essence of the moral consciousness. When I act on principle the sole factor determining my motive is that this particular action exemplifies a particular case falling under a general law or maxim. For Kant the mental process by which the actor understands that a particular case falls under a certain principle is an exercise in reasoning, or to be more precise, what Kant called practical reason, reason used as a guide to action. (Pure Reason is reason used to attain certainty, or what Kant called scientific knowledge. ) Since to have moral worth an action must be done on principle, and to see that a certain principle applies to a particular action requires the exercise of reason, only rational beings can be said to behave morally. 6. Why does Kant believe that to have moral worth an action must be done on principle rather than inclination? Kants argument here may seem strange to the contemporary outlook, for it assumes that everything in nature is designed to serve a purpose. Now it is an obvious fact that human beings do have a faculty of practical reason, reason applied to the guidance of actions. (Kant is of course fully aware the people often fail to employ this faculty; i. e. they act non-rationally (without reason) or even irrationally (against what reason dictates); but he intends that his ethical theory is normative, prescribing how people ought to behave, rather than descriptive of how they actually do behave.) If everything in nature serves some purpose then the faculty of practical reason must have some purpose. Kant argues that this purpose cannot be merely the attainment of some specific desired end, or even the attainment of happiness in general, for if it were, it would have been far better for nature simply to have endowed persons with an instinct to achieve this end, as is the case with the non- rational animals. Therefore, the fact that human beings have a faculty of practical reason cannot be explained by claiming that it allows them to attain some particular end. So the fact that reason can guide our actions, but cannot do so for the sake of achieving some desired end, leads Kant to the conclusion that the function of practical reason must be to allow humans as rational beings to apply general principles to particular instances of action, or in other words to engage in moral reasoning as a way of determining ones moral obligation: what is the right action to do. Thus we act morally only when we act rationally to apply a moral principle to determine the motive of our action. 7. Do all persons have the same moral duties? According to Kant only rational beings can be said to act morally. Reason for Kant (as for all the Enlightenment thinkers) is the same for all persons; in other words there isnt a poor mans reason versus a rich mans reason or a white mans reason versus a black mans reason. All persons are equal as potentially rational beings. Therefore, if reason dictates that one person, in a particular situation, has a moral duty to do a particular thing, then any person, in that same situation, would equally well have a duty to do that same thing. In this sense Kants reasoning parallels the way in which stoicism led Roman lawyers to the conclusion that all citizens are equal before the law. Thus Kant is a moral absolutist in the sense that all persons have the same moral duties, for all persons are equal as rational beings. But this absolutism does not mean that Kant holds that our moral duties are not relative to the situation in which we find ourselves. Thus it is quite possible for Kant to conclude that in one particular situation I may have a duty to keep my promise, but in another situation (in which, for example, keeping a promise conflicts with a higher duty) I may equally well be morally obligated to break a promise. 8. Why is it that actions done for the sake of some end cannot have moral worth? Since what ones moral duties are in a particular situation are the same for all persons, ones moral duties must be independent of the particular likes and dislikes of the moral agent. Now any action which is motivated by the desire for some particular end presupposes that the agent has the desire for that end. However, from the simple concept of a rational being it is not possible to deduce that any particular rational being would have any particular desired ends. Most people, of course, desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain, but there is no logical contradiction involved in the notion of a rational being who does not desire pleasure or perhaps who desires pain. Thus reason does not dictate that any particular rational being has any particular end. But if the desire for a particular end gave an action its moral worth, then only those rational beings who happened in fact to desire that end would regard such actions as good, while those that desired to avoid such an end, would regard the action as bad. (Thus for example eudaemonistic theories which assume the end of achieving happiness is what gives an action its moral value, would serve to induce only those beings who happened to have the desire for happiness to behave morally. For those rational beings who happened to desire to avoid happiness, there would be no incentive to behave morally and what appears good to the happiness-seeker will appear positively bad to one who seeks to avoid happiness. ) But, as we have seen above, Kants absolutism reaches the conclusion that moral obligation is the same for all persons. Thus the ground of moral obligation, what makes an action a moral duty, cannot lie in the end which that act produces. 9. What does reason tell us about the principle that determines the morally dutiful motive? Since Kant has ruled out the ends (i. e. the consequences) which an act produces as well as any motive but those determined by the application of principle as determining moral duty, he is faced now with the task of deriving the fundamental principles of his ethical theory solely from the concept of what it is to be a rational being. He now argues (in a very obscure manner) that from this notion of what is demanded by being rational, he can deduce that it would be irrational to act on any principle which would not apply equally to any other actor in the same situation. In other words, Kant claims that reason dictates that the act we are morally obligated to do is one which is motivated by adherence to a principle which could, without inconsistency, be held to apply to any (and all) rational agents. This fundamental ethical principle, which is commonly called The Categorical Imperative, Kant summarizes with the statement that I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim become a universal law. Kants claim that Reason demands the moral agent to act on a universal law thus in many ways parallels Jesus dictum that God commands that those who love Him obey The Golden Rule. 10. What is a categorical imperative? Any statement of moral obligation which I make the principle of my action (my maxim in Kants vocabulary), in the context of a specific situation, constitutes an imperative. I might, in such a situation, choose to act on a statement of the form, If I desire some specific end (e. g. happiness, maximum pleasure, power, etc. ), then I ought to do such and such an action. In doing so I would be acting on what Kant calls a hypothetical imperative. However, Kant has already ruled out ends as the grounds for moral obligation; thus hypothetical imperatives cannot serve as the basis for determining my moral duty. However, if I act on a principle which has the form, In circumstances of such and such a character, I ought to.

the banshee :: essays research papers fc

Beltane Essay Beltane is the last of the three spring fertility festivals. Beltane is the second principal Celtic festival (the other being Samhain). Celebrated approximately halfway between spring equinox and the midsummer (Summer Solstice). Beltane traditionally marked the arrival if summer in ancient times. At Beltane the Pleiades star cluster rises just before sunrise on the morning horizon. The Pleiades is a cluster of seven closely placed stars, the seven sisters, in the constellation of Taurus, near his shoulder. When looking for the Pleiades with the naked eye, remember it looks like a tiny dipper-shaped pattern of six moderately bright star in the constellation of Taurus. It stands very low in the east-northeast sky for just a few minutes before sunrise. Beltane, and its counterpart Samhain, divide the year into its two primary seasons, winter (Dark Part) and summer (Light Part). As Samhain is about honouring Death, Beltane is about honouring Life. It is the time when the sun is fully released from his bondage of winter and able to rule over summer and life once again. It is a time of "no time" when the veils between the two worlds are at their thinnest. No time is when the two worlds intermingle and unite and the magic abounds! It is the time when the Faeries return from their winter respite, carefree and full of faery mischief and faery delight. On the night before Beltane, in times past, folks would place rowan branches at their windows and doors for protection, many otherworldly occurrences could transpire during this time of "no time". Traditionally on the Isle of Man, the youngest member of the family gathers primroses on the eve before Beltane and throws the flowers at the door of the home for protection. In Ireland it is believed that food left over from May Eve must not be eaten, but rather buried or left as an offering to the faery instead. Much like the tradition of leaving of whatever is not harvested from the fields on Samhain, food on the time of no time is treated with great care. When the veils are so thin it is an extremely magical time, it is said that the Queen of the Faeries rides out on her white horse. Roving about on Beltane eve She will try to entice people away to the Faeryland. Legend has it that if you sit beneath a tree on Beltane night, you may see the Faery Queen or hear the sound of Her horse's bells as She rides through the night.

Business Ethics And Corporate Social Responsibility Environmental Sciences Essay

Hot, Flat, and Crowed. Friedman invented new footings for our 21th century. Hot is Global Warming, Flat is Globalization, and Crowed is Turning completion for resources. The convergences of these 3 tendencies are energy supply and demand, climate alteration, energy poorness, and biodiversity loss. Our American lifestyle utilizations nature recourses prodigally. If all of human being uses the same ingestion as American, the demand will be exaggerated and the Earth will non be able to supply resources to all. As a consequence, it will be intense completion for resources which will take to conflict. As energy demand exceeds supply, oil monetary values rises to maintain up with the demand which gives OPEC earn a batch of hard currency. When oil monetary values goes up, the lupus erythematosus freedom in non-oil bring forthing states. As we consume more oil, clime alteration have affected dramatically to nature, wildlife and us. Average sea degree worldwide is projected to lift up to two pess by the terminal of this century. This rise would extinguish about 10,000 square stat mis of land in the United States.1 As a consequence, it destroys biodiversity. We have to halt biodiversity now. Otherwise, following coevals will non cognize what is the bird of Jove or elephant expression like but lone presentation from computing machine graphic. Greater energy efficiency and new engineerings hold promise for cut downing nursery gases and work outing this planetary challenge. 1.6 billion Peoples in developing states do non hold entree to electricity. Without energy, they have no entree to instruction, communicating and medical specialty to populate in sustainable life. However, American needs a clean energy to power the grid. Clean energy will hike economic growing as new occupations are created and inducements are given to renewable companies. Current energy markets are dominated by oil, coal and gas companies. We need to follow clean energy. Price signal is requires to do i nvestors put in clean tech companies and merchandises. It will non go on if authorities is non involved by regulate new policies for clean company or giving revenue enhancement inducements to excite invention for energy efficient merchandises. He uses many instances of how tighter ordinance criterions which leads to efficient energy uses such as GE ‘s transit EVO train or revenue enhancement inducements to advanced merchandises such as intercrossed auto or clean Diesel auto. However, these will non work if we do non hold moralss of preservation to alter our life styles to something that has less consequence on the Earth. We are extinguishing population of species faster than we can detect new one. We cut down 1000s of estates of forest before we have clip to analyze or paperss what was at that place. We are fouling environment faster than the nature cans response. We are worry about the loss of species when it is excessively late when we can make nil about it. The loss of a individual species can hold drastic effects for many species and get down a concatenation reaction of devastation as radiating lines of dependence are severed. Relationships between the species on Earth are correlated. The saga of Yangtze elephantine darn is non merely threatened wildlife and biodiversity in China but besides people economically and environmentally in Mekong river country. ( Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam ) Since the Three Gorges Dam ( Yangtze River ) was operated, countries in Laos and northern Thailand have experienced many major inundations. For this ground, ecological systems have been destroyed. The impact of dam building of the dike is non merely in alteration the H2O rhythm but most of animate being species have vanished. In the rainy season, during the spawning season inundations. Fish will be encouraged from the rain that falls and so flows into the Mekong River and subdivisions. When the prohibitionist season, H2O will diminish, so fish ballad eggs. Uncertain of H2O from the dike are non merely dry down Natural nutrient supply of fish was severed but the accretion of dirt foods. The Lower Mekong is quickly losing foods. In add-on, it is impacting straight piscaries every bit good as agribusiness along dependent food flow with the tides accumulated in the dirt as fertiliser. Furthermore, Erosion of coastal eroding, the Mekong River happened every twelvemonth but normally in the last 5 old ages, villagers along the Mekong observed that the fast eroding of the seashore and more serious. It is expected that it may come together from assorted causes such as the building of port and gap of floodgate of dike has changed way of H2O flows. In the past old ages the Mekong River Commission has stated that Chinese dikes affect the drouth more terrible. However, Chinese governments did non unwrap a clear out. In add-on, China is non allowed to analyze the impact of the dike by a group of independent. With such issues placed on the national security. The Beijing ever emphasized that China developed the Upper Mekong part. Therefore, no duty for what happened to the Lower Mekong River. Damagess to those citizens in lower Mekong parts who are affected frequently been ignored. In Chinese eyes, at present the Mekong River is a resource for energy production. However the Chinese did non fall in the Mekong River Commission. The multi-party reappraisals that if China does non take part, committee is the lone paper. If China becomes a member, China besides must follow with many regulations. Therefore, these regulations would hinder barrier to the development of freedom in China. Ch ina is unacceptable. We all try to continue biodiversity but if the ace power authoritiess like China and United States are non involved. It is hard to go on when we all think about ourselves non biodiversity loss. Energy poorness is the deficiency of electricity in developing states. That means they have to utilize biomass such as wood or droppings as their primary beginning of cookery and warming fuel. Lack of entree to sustainable energy services and merchandises constrains cardinal facets of human development and growing. When it comes to planetary heating, hapless people is affected the most. Because they do non hold they do have electricity to refrigerating nutrient or medical specialty or desalting H2O in hot universe. Without electricity, these developing states do non hold entree to machines and communicating such as entree to libraries online or competes, connect and collaborate to people in level universe. Energy can non merely do developing states hotter but besides affected developed states. As information centres and naming services outsources to seek for low cost of labour, blackout energy could take to miss of connectivity to the crowed universe. The solution for these developin g states is developed states and UN should give finance new undertaking for sustainable economic growing. The World Bank claims that it is now financing more low-carbon energy undertakings in the underdeveloped universe, yet carbon-intensive energy undertakings continue to have more than five times every bit much World Bank support as low-carbon and energy efficiency undertakings. They are in the procedure of supplying a $ 3.75 billion loan to South African public-service corporation Eskom to construct a â€Å" supercritical † coal-burning works. The World Bank says such supercritical coal undertakings are more energy efficient than traditional coal-burning workss, but these power workss still contribute massively to planetary heating compared to alternative or renewable energy-powered plants.2 Recent surveies show that particulates from air pollution and carbon black are the 2nd prima cause of planetary warming behind C dioxide. Residents of developing states, peculiarly in Asia, breathe in the environmental contaminations of coal ‘s pollution every twenty-four hours. Smog visibly hangs over major urban centres and soot covers villages doing terrible respiratory diseases. In this book, Friedman proposes a Code Green Plan and foreground the demand for a whole new system to power the economic system growing. We need to replace full end product of the soiled fuel systems such as coal. The constituents of the program are Clean Electrons, Energy Efficiency, and Conservation. We need to excite invention to beginning of negatrons that is abundant, clean, dependable and inexpensive. In short clip, we must cut down the demand of energy because Clean Energy will non be here shortly. I believe that authorities policies, ordinances, research support and revenue enhancement inducements would excite a system for introducing, bring forthing, secretory organ deploying clean negatrons, energy sufficient and resource productiveness. As we have experienced economic sciences in recession in past old ages, most of people have lost their occupations. However, fabricating occupations in Green renewable energy have played a cardinal function in contending unemployment. With unemployment at highest record in decennaries, and oil and energy monetary value volatility driving concerns into the land, we can non afford to wait any longer. It is clip for a legislative for a comprehensive clean-energy investing program. In my sentiment, if we have attractive policies to concerns, it would drive the growing of renewable industries. For illustration, extends the Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit ( as it is done with intercrossed vehicles ) , Increases the sum of credits available, or Offers a hard currency grant in stead of the Manufacturing Tax Credit ( as is presently done with the Investment Tax Credit ) Since its debut in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 20093, the Manufacturing Tax Credit has proven to be an effectual tool to reinvigorate our fabrication base, but demand for support still exists. A greater than expected figure of companies applied for the plan, ensuing in an oversubscription of this plan by a ratio of 3 to 1.4 Increasing the sum of support, and the clip that such support is available, will supply inducements for more companies to do the passage to clean energy production. This will assist America construct up a green fabrication sector that can both make occupations at place and increase America ‘s competitory border in the green energy economic system. There ‘s another benefit to back uping supply companies over assembly companies. Both types of companies promote economic development, but workers in the supply concatenation, such as tool and die workers, welders, and mechanics, are by and large paid more than workers in the assembly concatenation. A noteworthy exclusion is in the car fabrication sector, where corporate bargaining contracts can ensue in higher-paid assembly jobs.5 Despite these of import benefits, Congress, non the Department of Energy, should be responsible for clearly saying the intent in legislative linguistic communication. Given that the federal authorities has dec ided to pass through the revenue enhancement codification, I support the attempt to increase the effectivity of the Manufacturing Tax Credit. And significantly, smart policies that strategically and expeditiously beforehand precedence authorities policies. I am impressed by how much China polluted our planet. They are taking the same way of soiled industrialisation as the West done. Five of the 10 most contaminated metropoliss worldwide are in China because air and H2O are polluted. That leads China to the record-high temperature for 11th twelvemonth in a row. Back so Chinese people can swim in the Yangtze River but they can no longer see because the toxic pollution has poisoned so many China ‘s rivers and lakes. Furthermore, wellness issues are one of serious issues Chinese is sing. One 4th of Chinese citizens do non hold entree for clean H2O. For this ground, 70 per centum of all deathly malignant neoplastic disease instances are related to the environment. The authorities has realized this and has been taking little stairss to travel green while more refering about economic growing. However, put to deathing a green program is non easy because of the big inactiveness and the deficiency of control over authoritiess. As I mention ed above, authorities more concern about GDP and make non care about the effects of environmental as they are making with Yangtze River dike. However, The U.S. demand to take moral land in taking clean energy because China will follow us as it has no pick but to follow universe criterion. Meanwhile, America has been discoursing greening for excessively long with no action. Decision devising is being lobbied by traditional energy companies that oppose inducements to renewable energy. Furthermore, Congress is allowing funding to the incorrect undertakings alternatively of scientific discipline and development. It took 11 old ages to link a air current farm 275 stat mis to LA, comparing to the velocity at China is constructing power workss of one every 2 hebdomads. So, we need U.S. authorities to take our planet to be a better for our following coevals before it is excessively late. â€Å" If America becomes the illustration of a state that takes the lead in developing clean power, energy efficiency, preservation systems, so grows more productive, healthy, respected, comfortable, competitory, advanced, & A ; secure as a consequence, many more states will emulate us voluntarily † . -Thomas

The Role of Ozone in the Atmosphere and Environment

Essentially, ozone (O3) is an unstable and highly reactive form of oxygen. The ozone molecule is made up of three oxygen atoms that are bound together, whereas the oxygen we breathe (O2) contains only two oxygen atoms. From a human perspective, ozone is both helpful and harmful, both good and bad. The Benefits of Good Ozone Small concentrations of ozone occur naturally in the stratosphere, which is part of the Earth’s upper atmosphere. At that level, ozone helps to protect life on Earth by absorbing ultraviolet radiation from the sun, particularly UVB radiation that can cause skin cancer and cataracts, damage crops, and destroy some types of marine life. The Origin of Good Ozone Ozone is created in the stratosphere when ultraviolet light from the sun splits an oxygen molecule into two single oxygen atoms. Each of those oxygen atoms then binds with an oxygen molecule to form an ozone molecule. Depletion of stratospheric ozone poses serious health risks for humans and environmental hazards for the planet, and many nations have banned or limited the use of chemicals, including CFC, that contribute to ozone depletion. The Origin of Bad Ozone Ozone is also found much nearer the ground, in the troposphere, the lowest level of Earth’s atmosphere. Unlike the ozone that occurs naturally in the stratosphere, tropospheric ozone is man-made, an indirect result of air pollution created by automobile exhaust and emissions from factories and power plants. When gasoline and coal are burned, nitrogen oxide gases (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOC) are released into the air. During the warm, sunny days of spring, summer and early fall, NOx and VOC are more likely to combine with oxygen and form ozone. During those seasons, high concentrations of ozone are often formed during the heat of the afternoon and early evening (as a component of smog) and are likely to dissipate later in the evening as the air cools. Does ozone pose a significant risk to our climate? Not really - ozone does have a small role to play in global climate change, but the majority of the risks are elsewhere. The Risks of Bad Ozone The man-made ozone that forms in the troposphere is extremely toxic and corrosive. People who inhale ozone during repeated exposure may permanently damage their lungs or suffer from respiratory infections. Ozone exposure may reduce lung function or aggravate existing respiratory conditions such as asthma, emphysema or bronchitis. Ozone may also cause chest pain, coughing, throat irritation or congestion. The adverse health effects of ground-level ozone are particularly dangerous for people who work, exercise, or spend a lot of time outdoors during warm weather. Seniors and children are also at greater risk than the rest of the population because people in both age groups are more likely to have reduced or not fully formed lung capacity. In addition to human health effects, ground-level ozone is also hard on plants and animals, damaging ecosystems and leading to reduced crop and forest yields. In the United States alone, for example, ground-level ozone accounts for an estimated $500 million in reduced crop production annually. Ground-level ozone also kills many seedlings and damages foliage, making trees more susceptible to diseases, pests and harsh weather. No Place is Completely Safe from Ground-Level Ozone Ground-level ozone pollution is often considered an urban problem because it is formed primarily in urban and suburban areas. Nevertheless, ground-level ozone also finds its way to rural areas, carried hundreds of miles by the wind or forming as a result of auto emissions or other sources of air pollution in those areas.​ Edited by Frederic Beaudry.